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INTRODUCTION
Standing "is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers."' Most often, the powers thought to be separated thereby are the
three branches of the federal government.2 Less attention has been paid to
standing's use in maintaining the proper spheres of activity for the federal
and state governments.3
One scholar who has paid attention to federalism issues and standing
doctrine is now-Judge William Fletcher. As he noted in 1990,4 plaintiffs
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. Deepest thanks to
Judge William A. Fletcher for inspiring this Symposium and this piece and for his helpful comments at
the Symposium. Thanks also to Tara Grove, Andy Hessick, Bob Pushaw, Tom Rowe, Jon Siegel, Max
Stearns, and Ernie Young for their participation in and comments at the Symposium. Finally, thanks to
Sarah Simpler for invaluable research assistance.
I. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
2. E.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
3. Given the volume of articles on standing doctrine, the comparatively lesser scholarship that
discusses standing and federalism is still extensive. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a
Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 493-96 (2012); Helen Hershkoff,
State Courts and the 'Passive Virtues': Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833
(2001); Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?:
Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008); Dru
Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart, Standing as Channeling in the Administrative Age, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1357,
1407-15 (2012); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387 (1995).
Of course, the literature on federalism and Article III generally (as opposed to standing doctrine
specifically) is voluminous.
4. William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of
Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 264 (1990).
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who lack Article III standing may bring federal law claims in state courts
because the state courts are not bound by Article III, and yet, precisely
because those plaintiffs lack Article III standing, the Supreme Court could
not hear an appeal.5 The troubling result is that state courts can announce
unreviewable decisions on federal law.
The Supreme Court in ASARCO held that a losing defendant in such a
case would have standing to appeal because of the adverse judgment, but a
losing plaintiff, who lacked federal standing to sue initially, could not
appeal.6 Since such plaintiffs usually invoke federal law and defendants
reject it, the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over state
court decisions favorable to federal law but not over those contrary to it.
Because review is forbidden precisely where it is most needed, Fletcher
argued, the state courts should be made to apply Article III justiciability
standards to federal questions: federal law cases should be heard in state
court only when they can be heard in federal court.7
To add further symmetry to what we might call this doctrine of
federalism standing, Andy Hessick argues in this volume that diversity
cases in federal court, which are always predicated on state-law claims,
should be judged by the standing doctrine of the alternative state forum
rather than by federal Article III standards. In this way, state law will have
its true scope and litigants will be truly free to choose between state and
federal court in diversity cases.8
A third permutation of federalism standing may have arisen in the
recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Hollingsworth v. Perry. There, a federal
district court struck down under the federal Constitution a voter-enacted
ban on marriage between same-sex couples (Prop 8).9 The state officials
who would normally defend such laws declined to do so, and the Ninth
Circuit, relying on a California Supreme Court decision, 10 held that the
proponents of the ballot initiative (the Proponents) had standing to appeal
on behalf of the State." The United States Supreme Court ultimately held
that the Proponents lacked standing and dismissed the appeal.12
This is a federalism standing problem, albeit a less common one,
parallel to those discussed by Fletcher and Hessick. True, it is not a federal
question in state court, nor a state law case in federal court. Instead, it is a
5. Id.
6. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618-23 (1989).
7. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 263, 264; see infra notes 21-42, 44 and accompanying text.
8. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA. L. REv. 417, 418 (2013).
9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013) (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
10. Perry v. Brown (Perry 111), 265 P.3d 1002, 1005-07 (Cal. 2011).
11. Perry v. Brown (Perry I), 671 F.3d 1052, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652; see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
12. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652; see infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
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federal question in federal court that nevertheless implicates important
federalism issues. Can or should standing in the federal court depend on the
state's political structure? If it can't or shouldn't, do the people of
California receive justice?
Standing for the Proponents might have been predicated on well-
established concepts permitting the assignment of claims: qui tam relators
sue to vindicate harms to the United States, and assignees may litigate
claims. 13 The Supreme Court distinguished these cases, apparently worried
about the consequences of a broad standing holding. 14
However, the Court could have adopted the California Supreme
Court's holding that Proponent standing was essential to vindicating
California's ballot initiative system. On this narrower logic, Proponent
standing depends on a fundamental aspect of state governance and applies
in many fewer cases. 15 And there is good reason for the Court to have
adopted the California court's logic. When the Court rejected it, the People
of California were left with no way to defend their constitutional
amendment. That seems a bad outcome for "Our Federalism.'
6
More generally, I think this case highlights some of the pernicious
consequences of the Court's metastasizing standing doctrine. 17 Article III
makes the Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of federal law questions.
How then is it not within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear an
appeal, when a federal court has struck down a state constitutional
amendment under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution? The state
officials may have acquiesced in that act, but why should that matter?
Shouldn't a higher court make sure the lower court was correct in striking
down that amendment? Doesn't "Our Federalism" demand that?
I. FLETCHER'S FEDERALISM STANDING
While it is Fletcher's Structure of Standing article that inspired this
Symposium, 18 his article The 'Case or Controversy' Requirement in State
Court Adjudication of Federal Questions' 9 has also been influential.2 ° In it,
13. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
14. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665.
15. See infta notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
16. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("What the concept does represent is a system in
which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.").
17. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
18. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
19. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 263.
20. Westlaw citation check on September 1, 2013 finds 71 citations to this article.
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he notes that the states' freedom from Article III constraints "has had two
linked and anomalous consequences": state courts can hear federal law
questions when the plaintiff lacks Article III standing, and the Supreme
Court cannot review those decisions. 21 Both affect Our Federalism.
First, Fletcher notes, for the first century of our republic, the federal
and state courts had similar views of what constituted the "judicial power":
courts acted judicially when they decided cases or controversies, but not
when they issued advisory opinions (as many state courts can under their
own constitutions).22 While the Supreme Court could not review state court
advisory opinions, "no one questioned the Supreme Court's constitutional
authority to review all state court decisions in litigated cases dealing with
federal law."23 Fletcher concedes that this latter point is nowhere explicitly
discussed, but he concludes that this means everyone "simply assumed"
such review was available.24
By the early 1900s, Fletcher shows, state courts had started to issue
decisions in disputes that did not clearly look like cases or controversies,
and the Court responded with "genuine puzzlement about how to treat state
court decisions in such suits. '25 The paradigm suit looks like this:
The plaintiff challenged a state statute in state court on the ground
that it violated the federal Constitution; the state court, using a
standard of justiciability that differed from the federal standard,
agreed to hear the case and sustained the statute; the United States
Supreme Court held that it could not review the state court decision
because the plaintiff had not shown a stake in the legal question he
sought to have litigated; and the judgment of the state court
sustaining the statute against a federal constitutional challenge was
left undisturbed.26
Thus, "as state courts allowed litigants to assert unconventional
interests or to seek unconventional forms of relief' 27 (for example, in the
early twentieth century, state courts but not federal courts could issue
declaratory judgments),28 the Court's jurisdiction to hear appeals in those
cases became more problematic. In addition, given the Supreme Court's
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions contrary to
21. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 264.
22. Id. at 266-69.
23. Id. at 269.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 279.
26. Id. at 274.
27. Id. at 279.
28. Id. (citing Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202) (2006)).
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federal right, the Court came to use justiciability reasoning for "the further
and ulterior purpose of permitting it to avoid deciding difficult or awkward
cases."
29
When the federal courts were empowered to hear declaratory judgment
actions, and when the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state court
decisions contrary to federal right was made discretionary, Fletcher argues,
the justifications for the Court's odd justiciability rules over state court
decisions became less tenable. 30 The Court's decision in ASARCO, Inc. v.
Kadish was an effort to change the approach to such cases, but it provided
only "a [p]artial and [p]erverse reform.",31 The Court held that, even though
plaintiffs would have lacked Article III standing had they sued in federal
court, the Supreme Court nevertheless had jurisdiction because the
defendants had standing to appeal. The defendants were harmed by the
adverse judgment, which upheld the plaintiffs' federal law claim against
the defendants' state law defense, and that harm was concrete and
immediate enough to satisfy Article 111.32 As Fletcher notes, "[t]hat the
defendants were adversely affected by the state court judgment should have
been beside the point, for the difficulty had always been that the plaintiffs
(not the defendants) had insufficient interest to satisfy [A]rticle III."
3
Moreover, "[i]t is very odd to give a right of appeal to only one party,
contrary to the virtually universal practice in Anglo-American
jurisprudence of granting appeal symmetrically, either to both parties or to
neither.,
34
Most problematically, however, Fletcher notes that "Asarco grants
review to precisely the wrong side"35:
[T]here has always been greater distrust of state court decisions
sustaining state statutes against federal challenges than of decisions
striking down state statutes. Yet the effect of Asarco is to grant
review when the state court is most to be trusted (when it strikes
down a state statute), but to deny review when the state court is
most to be distrusted (when it sustains a state statute).36
The solution, Fletcher argues, is to require state courts to apply federal
Article III justiciability standards when hearing federal law claims.37 I call
29. Id. at 276.
30. Id. at 279-80.
31. Id. at 280 (citing ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618-23 (1989)).
32. Id. at 280-81 (summarizing ASARCO).
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 281-82.
37. Id. at 282.
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his solution "federalism standing" because his argument is explicitly based
in considerations of federalism. Fletcher notes that we often forget that
state courts, as well as federal courts, decide federal law questions:
We should free ourselves of the mistaken, perhaps largely
unconscious, habit of thinking that only the federal courts are
important enough to have a "case or controversy"
requirement .... To the degree that the "case or controversy"
requirement serves the values of sensitive and wise adjudication, it
should apply to both state and federal courts.38
Fletcher also reminds us that federalism is about protecting the federal
powers, not just the states' powers. The Supreme Court is "the final
appellate tribunal on questions of federal law," and the ASARCO rule
insulates certain state court decisions from Supreme Court review, indeed
from decisions "where review is most needed.,
39
But Fletcher's solution also protects the states. It "treat[s] the [state and
federal] courts as genuine partners in the business of adjudicating federal
law., 40 It also protects state lawmaking processes from state courts who
might strike down state law while "hid[ing] behind the supposed
commands of the federal sovereign" in cases that are nevertheless
unreviewable by the federal Supreme Court.41
How can Article III standards be enforced in state court suits involving
federal law? Fletcher relies largely on "the good faith of the state
courts... to follow the commands of federal law," but notes that direct
review by the U.S. Supreme Court in a few cases and the treatment of non-
Article-III decisions as non-preclusive will police the boundaries.42
Other scholars have suggested different solutions to the ASARCO
problem, but none address the full federalism problem noted by Fletcher.
Matthew Hall, for example, would have the Court return to jurisdiction
over state-court decisions adverse to claims of federal right; he rejects
Fletcher's solution as too much an imposition on "state prerogatives to
structure state judicial systems as state authorities see fit. '43 But, as
Fletcher notes, state courts that decide claims favorable to federal right
may trample state legislative prerogatives-and, if those anti-state law
decisions are incorrect on federal law and yet unreviewable by the Supreme
38. Id. at 283.
39. Id. at 283-84.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 288-90.
42. Id. at 303.
43. Matthew 1. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1257, 1261 (2011); see also
Brian A. Stem, Note, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal "Case or Controversy " Requirement
on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 77 (1994).
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Court, state legislatures have no recourse. 44 Moreover, Hall's concern
ignores the federal law basis for all the claims at issue: if federal law is
supreme, and if the United States Supreme Court's central role is as final
arbiter of federal law questions, those concerns need to be weighed in the
balance as well.
Paul Katz adds that Congress's interests are implicated, because
Congress enacts laws against a background of which plaintiffs it expects
will enforce private rights of action under those laws. "When Congress
faces state courts with a variety of standing requirements, however, its
statutory policy will receive a different level of enforcement.., depending
on the jurisdiction. ' For this reason, Katz argues, state courts should have
to follow federal standing rules in federal law cases.46 But Robert Schapiro
points out that Congress may want state courts to be enforcing federal law
when the federal courts will not: "In this way, the state courts and Congress
act as partners in realizing federal statutory rights. '47
My mission here is not to take sides in the debate over who should
have standing in state courts to enforce federal law-my general criticisms
of the Court's Article III standing doctrine demonstrate that I would prefer
a broader approach in both state and federal courts48-but merely to
emphasize that standing doctrine has important federalism components. In
this volume, Professor Hessick demonstrates a mirror-image problem of
federalism standing: if state courts have different standing rules, then those
rules should apply to diversity cases in federal court4 9 If federal courts
apply Article III limitations that do not apply in state court, then state law
causes of action are given less (or greater) scope than state legislatures
meant them to have; 50 litigants also do not have the free choice between the
state and federal forum that diversity jurisdiction is meant to provide.51
Thus standing doctrine turns out to have important federalism aspects
when federal forums hear state law cases and when state forums hear
federal law cases. As I discuss in the next Part, the recent marriage-equality
case from California may represent a new form of federalism standing: a
federal question case in federal court that nevertheless implicates important
federalism issues.
44. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 288-90.
45. Paul J. Katz, Comment, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing Doctrine,
and the Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1316, 1318 (2005).
46. Id. at 1316-17.
47. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 305
(2005).
48. Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose
Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 592-98 (2012); Elliott, supra note 2, at 508-17.
49. Hessick, supra note 8, at 418.




II. HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY
The Supreme Court determined in June 2013 that it lacked jurisdiction
to review a lower-court decision striking down California's ban on
marriage between same-sex couples-a ban enacted through California's
ballot initiative system. The Court's standing decision leaves intact a far-
reaching district court decision striking down on federal grounds that
initiative-created California constitutional amendment. As much as one
might agree with that outcome on the merits (which has the effect of
recognizing marriage equality in California), the standing analysis has
important and problematic federalism implications. After reviewing the
background of the case in this Part, I discuss this new instance of
federalism standing in Part III.
Prop 8 was enacted in 2008,52 adding to the California Constitution the
language: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California., 53 Soon thereafter, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier,
a lesbian couple, and Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, a gay couple,
challenged this enactment by suing in the federal District Court for the
Northern District of California in San Francisco. 4 Named as defendants
were several California officials, including then-Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger and then-Attorney-General Jerry Brown; the officials
appeared but refused to defend the law. The Proponents, who had put Prop
8 on the ballot and campaigned for it, intervened to provide that defense.55
The district court ultimately struck down California's gay marriage ban as
violating both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.56
The plaintiffs had Article III standing, their desire to marry frustrated
by the voter-enacted ban on marriage between same-sex couples. Because
the California officials remained as parties in the trial court, the status of
the Proponents when they intervened as defenders of Prop 8 was not
closely scrutinized. But after the district court struck down Prop 8, the
California officials did not appeal.57 Because the U.S. Supreme Court had
previously suggested that ballot initiative proponents lacked standing to
52. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov-complete.pdf.
53. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 128 (2008),
available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-
laws.pdf#prop8.
54. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry 1), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd 628 F.3d
1191 (9th Cir. 2011), pet. for cert.filed (Jul 30, 2012) (No. 12-144).
55. Id. at 928.
56. Id. at 927.
57. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry 11), 628 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert.
filed (Jul 30, 2012) (No. 12-144).
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appeal a judgment striking down their initiative, 58 questions immediately
emerged regarding the Proponents' standing to appeal the invalidation of
Prop 8.
The Ninth Circuit, concerned that it lacked jurisdiction but mindful of
the special context of ballot initiatives, concluded that California election
law held the answer to the Proponents' standing.60 It therefore certified to
the California Supreme Court the question whether California law made the
Proponents the proper parties to defend Prop 8 on appeal.61
The California Supreme Court, in response, held that California law
made the Proponents proper representatives of the State in defending
Prop 8.62 While the Court stated that it expected public officials to defend
state statutes when their constitutionality is challenged in federal court, the
Court noted that when those officials declined to do so, the California
constitution and statutes "authorize the official proponents ... to
participate.. . in a judicial proceeding to assert the state's interest in the
initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure. 63
The Court emphasized that, without oversight from the Proponents, state
officials might discriminate against laws enacted by direct democracy:
"[T]he voters.. . may reasonably harbor a legitimate concern that the
public officials. . . may not, in the case of an initiative measure, always
undertake such a defense with vigor .... ,,64
The Ninth Circuit, after receiving the California Supreme Court's
answer to the certified question, proceeded to find that the Proponents had
Article III standing to proceed with the appeal.65 However, the Ninth
Circuit's standing analysis seems far broader than the California court's.
The Ninth Circuit held that, when a state had suffered a harm-any harm,
apparently--"[a]ll a federal court need determine is ... that the party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court is authorized by the state to
represent its interest in remedying that harm. 66 California was harmed by
the determination that Prop 8 was unconstitutional, and California had
authorized ballot initiative proponents to defend their initiatives when
California elected officials refused to do so; thus the Proponents were
58. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520-U.S. 43, 66 (1997).
59. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010)
(citing Arizonans) (order granting motion to stay).
60. Perry 11, 628 F.3d at 1196 ("The parties agree that 'Proponents' standing'-and therefore our
ability to decide this appeal-'"rises or falls' on whether California law' affords them the interest or
authority described in the previous section." (quoting and citing only the Proponents' brief)).
61. Id. at 1193.
62. Perry 111, 265 P.3d 1002, 1125-26 (Cal. 2011).
63. Id. at 1152.
64. Id. at 1125.
65. Perry IV, 671 F.3d 1052, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012).
66. Id. at 1072.
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proper defenders of Prop 8.67 The Ninth Circuit went on to affirm the
district court's decision on considerably narrower grounds.68
The Supreme Court, after ordering special briefing on the question of
the Proponents' standing to appeal, held, 5-4, that the Proponents lacked
standing.69 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, concluded that the Proponents personally could point
only to a generalized grievance of the kind long found insufficient to
support standing. 70 And while California had suffered an injury in having
its law invalidated, it had chosen not to appeal. The Proponents were thus
barred by usual rules against "third-party" standing from appealing. In
addition, the Proponents held no official position in state government
authorizing them to appeal, nor were they agents of the State under any
standard definition of agency.7' The Court concluded by emphasizing its
respect for the California Supreme Court and the California initiative
system. Yet, the Court says, "standing in federal court is a question of
federal law, not state law. And no matter its reasons, the fact that a State
thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized
grievance cannot override our settled law to the contrary.
', 72
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor,
would have adopted the California Supreme Court's view and allowed the
Proponents to defend Prop 8 on appeal. Justice Kennedy criticized the
majority's failure to recognize the consequences of its decision for
California, stating that, "[i]n my view Article III does not require
California, when deciding who may appear in court to defend an initiative
on its behalf, to comply with the Restatement of Agency or with this
Court's view of how a State should make its laws or structure its
government., 73 The Court failed to "take into account the fundamental
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in California"
67. Id. at 1075.
68. Id. at 1076-96 (noting that "[t]he district court held Proposition 8 unconstitutional [using
fairly broad arguments under] the Due Process Clause [and under] the Equal Protection Clause," further
noting that "Plaintiff-Intervenor San Francisco also offer a third argument [under the Equal Protection
Clause which provides] the narrowest ground for adjudicating the constitutional questions before us,"
and adopting that narrowest ground).
69. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
70. Id. at 2662.
71. Id. at 2664-67. This part of the opinion reveals that the Court was most likely trying to get rid
of the case so that it did not have to reach the merits. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
Agency comes up only because the Court itself had sloppily referred to it in Arizonans. The Proponents'
argument, when read fully, does not depend at all on a concept of agency. But the Court beats the
concept of agency to death in rejecting the Proponents' standing. "The lady doth protest too much,
methinks." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 2.
72. Hollingsworth, 233 S. Ct. at 2667.
73. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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and that failure "has implications for the 26 other States -that use an
initiative or popular referendum system.
74
Justice Kennedy started by acknowledging the truth of the Court's
statement: "[A] proponent's standing to defend an initiative in federal court
is a question of federal law.",75 But, Justice Kennedy wrote, the federal
requirements are satisfied by the Proponents. First, California "sustained a
concrete injury, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III, when a
United States District Court nullified a portion of its State Constitution.,
76
Second, California has an initiative system precisely to allow the People to
act despite the preferences of their elected officials, and the California
Supreme Court held that the Proponents were proper parties to represent
the State in court when the state officials refused to do SO.77 The Court
should have deferred to that choice, particularly because other similar
litigation arrangements have long been recognized as proper under Article
1.78 Thus Justice Kennedy and three of his fellow Justices would have
held that the Proponents were proper appellants and that the Court had
jurisdiction.
III. A NEW INSTANCE OF FEDERALISM STANDING?
Hollingsworth suggests a new category of federalism standing: a case
of federal law in federal court that nonetheless raises important federalism
issues. If the California Supreme Court has determined that the Proponents'
participation is necessary for California democracy, that determination
deserves more deference than it received from the U.S. Supreme Court.
After explaining why this is not merely another confusing yet tolerable
addition to already confusing standing doctrine, I explain why the U.S.
Supreme Court was correct to reject the Ninth Circuit's standing analysis
and yet wrong to reject the California Supreme Court's reasoning. I
conclude by noting that my previous arguments for a prudential abstention
doctrine, in place of today's mandatory tripartite test, would better serve
the issues raised by federalism standing.
A. The Supreme Court's Holding Is Troubling and Unusual
It is usually worth asking whether the standing rule established by a




77. Id. at 2669.
78. Id. at 2673-74.
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Much of the time, the rule established is not particularly hard to follow
(buy airplane tickets, says Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife;79 actually hike in
the wilderness area at issue, says Sierra Club v. Morton)80 even if the rule
is viewed as a senseless hurdle by those who have to satisfy it and is
viewed as illogical or worse by those (like me) who find the whole standing
quagmire bad doctrine.
Here, I think there is very good reason to be concerned by the Supreme
Court's holding that the Proponents lack standing to appeal. Having the gay
marriage case cut short after the district court opinion leaves an issue of
great national importance 81 in limbo and, more to the point of this
discussion of federalism standing, leaves the voters of California (at least
those who supported Prop 8) with no avenue of review even though their
law had been declared unconstitutional.82
I acknowledge that there is a misfit between the Proponents' use of the
legislative process against a historically oppressed minority and then of the
courts to defend that legislation. Given footnote four of Carolene Products,
the role of the courts is to protect the minority, not to give the majority a
second bite at a legislative apple.83 But logically this is not a second bite:
this is not going to court after you have lost at the ballot box. Instead, the
Proponents sought to defend a duly enacted law. Even though Prop 8's
discrimination against same-sex couples is reprehensible, the law was
enacted by the People of California, and the standing of the Proponents to
defend the California Constitution should not, I believe, depend on the
content of the ballot initiative.84 Any Carolene Products concerns must be
balanced with respect for Our Federalism.
It is also worth noting that Hollingsworth presents an unusual appellate
standing problem. The vast majority of standing decisions are about
79. 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992)
80. 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)
81. See, e.g., Perry 11, 628 F.3d 1191, 1200-02 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (stating that "[o]ral
argument before this court was viewed on television and the Internet by more people than have ever
watched an appellate court proceeding in the history of the Nation" and describing the case as involving
a "critical constitutional question that is of interest to all Americans, and particularly to the millions of
Californians who voted for Proposition 8 and the tens of thousands of same-sex couples who wish to
marry in that state").
82. Cf Perry v. Brown, 681 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (describing Perry v. Brown as a "momentous case" and one that "overruled
the will of seven million California Proposition 8 voters").
83. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
84. ' [T]he question before us involves a fundamental procedural issue that may arise with
respect to any initiative measure, without regard to its subject matter."' Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.




whether the plaintiff has standing to start the case at all; those decisions
implicate the extension of the federal courts' powers into ultra vires areas.
There is something fundamentally different, it seems to me, about appellate
jurisdiction when the trial court undoubtedly had jurisdictionY
B. The Ninth Circuit's Standing Analysis Was Problematic
In finding the Supreme Court's analysis problematic, I do not intend to
suggest that it should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Although
that court properly held that the Proponents had standing to appeal, its
reasoning was overly broad.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that state law could not directly answer
the federal standing question: "[W]e do not suggest that state law has any
power directly to enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction. Standing to sue in
any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend
on the party's standing in state court., 86 However, here, because the State
was the relevant party-the State conceived as the People of California,
rather than its elected representatives-special circumstances justified
deference to state law. Thus "[s]tate law does have the power ... to answer
questions antecedent to determining federal standing, such as the one here:
who is authorized to assert the People's interest in the constitutionality of
an initiative measure?"
87
The Ninth Circuit thus asked the California Supreme Court to
determine whether the Proponents were proper parties to represent the
People of California on appeal.88 That court concluded that, because the
initiative process would be short-circuited if state officials could decline to
defend initiative-enacted law, the Proponents must have standing to defend
that law.
89
Oddly, however, the Ninth Circuit's opinion on standing went much
further than the California Supreme Court's answer. The Ninth Circuit set
out the relevant test as follows: "All a federal court need determine is that
the state has suffered a harm sufficient to confer standing and that the party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court is authorized by the state to
represent its interest in remedying that harm." 90 While in Perry IV the
relevant harm to California was the invalidation of a constitutional
amendment, the Ninth Circuit's test suggested that any harm to a state
would qualify.
85. Heather Elliott, Standing to Appeal (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
86. Perry IV, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).
87. Id. at 1074-75.
88. Perry 11, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193(9thCir. 2011).
89. Perry 111, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011).
90. Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis added).
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This logic may seem proper under existing Supreme Court precedent
allowing the assignment of claims, where the person who suffered an
Article III injury in fact is different from the person who litigates the claim
based on that harm. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court found standing
for qui tam relators in the Vermont Agency case.91 The False Claims Act
confers on private citizens the power to sue on behalf of the United States
to recover payments made on fraudulent claims (such as falsified bills on a
federal highway construction project).92 Qui tam relators are not themselves
injured in any way by false claims, other than the injury that all of us feel
when the Treasury is defrauded-a harm too generalized to justify Article
III standing.93 The Court nevertheless upheld the relator provisions of the
False Claims Act: the relator has standing, the Court held, because he is an
assignee of the Government's claim for damages.94 The United States is
harmed when it is defrauded; the FCA "can reasonably be regarded as
effecting a partial assignment" of the right to sue to redress that harm.95 In
addition, "the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and the
American Colonies"96 is "well nigh conclusive" evidence that "qui tam
actions were 'cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to,
and resolved by, the judicial process.' 97 Thus, qui tam relators can proceed
under Article III.
The Court has similarly upheld the standing of those who litigate cases
under private assignment agreements. According to a 2008 case, I can
assign my claim to you to litigate for me, and even if what I pay you for
doing so has no relationship to the amount you recover on my behalf, you
have standing to proceed under Article III, because I would have had
standing. 98 Nor does it matter that you suffer no personal injury; you are
suing to get redress for my injury.
99
91. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006).
93. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-574 (1992) ("We have
consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government-
claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large-does
not state an Article III case or controversy.")
94. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765.
95. Id. at 765-66.
96. Id. at 774. In this way, the government and the relator have a relationship akin to that
between an assignor and an assignee of a claim. Cf Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 2531, 2542 (2008).
97. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 777 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102
(1998)).
98. Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2542 ("It is, of course, true that the aggregators did not originally suffer
any injury caused by the long-distance carriers; the payphone operators did. But the payphone operators
assigned their claims to the aggregators lock, stock, and barrel.").
99. Id. at 2543.
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Thus, one might think that the Ninth Circuit's standing syllogism (state
suffers harm, assigns right to sue to private citizen) is a simple application
of the qui tam and assignment cases. But there are three concerns with the
Ninth Circuit's logic. The first is the interest assigned. When the United
States assigns its interest in a false claim to a qui tam relator, it assigns a
proprietary interest similar to that any private person might have in, e.g., a
damages claim. One might question whether the State of California's harm
qua state is similarly delegable, 100 though both the majority and dissents in
Hollingsworth appear to believe it is. 101 Indeed, much more "core"
sovereign interests have been delegated in the past.10 2 Nevertheless, to
assign a State's sovereign interest in its laws seems somewhat different
from assigning a State's private property interests.
The second concern is with how the claim is assigned. The Court
suggests in the Sprint case that the contractual nature of that assignment
was important. 10 3 The majority in Hollingsworth repeatedly expresses
concern that the Proponents do not have any fiduciary obligations to
California because the State's claim is assigned to the Proponents merely
by their voluntary status as proponents. Thus, for the Ninth Circuit to
consider this claim "assigned" may be a stretch. As I discuss below, the
federalism concerns involved in Hollingsworth counsel deference to
California's choices here; while the means of assignment might make a
difference if we are adopting the broad rule the Ninth Circuit embraces,
100. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8's Sponsors, BLAG, and the
Government's Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 173-176 (contending that, because recognizing
marriages and conferring benefits on married people "is a power that only the government can
exercise," California cannot delegate its right to defend Prop 8 on appeal to the Proponents, and further
rejecting Proponents' standing on California law, legislative standing, taxpayer standing, and legislature
standing); Andrew Kim, Note, 'Standing' in the Way of Equality?: The Myth of Proponent Standing
and the Jurisdictional Error in Perry v. Brown, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1867, 1878-1885 (2012). It is true
that the Court held that the Proponents had no interest in enforcement, Slip Op. at 8, but that was stated
in the context of why the Proponents personally suffered no concrete harm in the Article III sense.
When discussing whether California can delegate its harm, the Court clearly states that it can.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013).
101. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 ("To vindicate [its interest in the constitutionality of its
laws] or any other [interest], a State must be able to designate agents to represent it in federal court.");
id. at 2673 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the federal rules of criminal procedure allow federal
courts to appoint private attorneys to investigate and prosecute instances of criminal contempt).
102. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541-42 & n.4 (1943) (allowing an
informer's action to proceed, in which private citizens prosecuted criminal instances of fraud against the
U.S.: "Congress has power to choose this method to protect the government from burdens fraudulently
imposed upon it; to nullify the criminal statute because of dislike of the independent informer sections
would be to exercise a veto power which is not ours.").
103. Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2543 ("Petitioners make a purely functional argument, as well. Read as
a whole, they say, the assignments in this litigation constitute nothing more than a contract for legal
services. We think this argument is overstated. There is an important distinction between simply hiring
a lawyer and assigning a claim to a lawyer (on the lawyer's promise to remit litigation proceeds). The
latter confers a property right (which creditors might attach); the former does not.").
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here, given the more limited reach of federalism standing, California
should determine who represents it.
10 4
Third, and most pragmatically, the logic of the Ninth Circuit's holding
logically extends far further than the Supreme Court is likely to desire.
States can assert not only the whole range of harms that a human person or
corporation can assert (think, for example, of Massachusetts's claim of loss
of real property in its challenge to the EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse
gases, which a majority of the Supreme Court held sufficient under Article
111)105 but also any number of harms to their sovereignty and their
people. 106
So, for example, states challenging the newly enacted federal
healthcare law (known as Obamacare and properly called the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act) asserted broad rights to sue the federal
government simply because they claimed that a federal law might interfere
with a state law. 10 7 As amici in one of the cases stated,
[I]f a putative conflict between state and federal law itself sufficed
to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of standing analysis, there would
be no way of ensuring that the challenged federal law actually
injured an individual party; the existence of standing would be
governed simply by the abstract-and quite possibly
hypothetical-conflict between state and federal law. 
108
Alexander Bickel made a similar criticism of 1960s voting litigation by the
Southern states: "It would make a mockery, moreover, of the constitutional
requirement of case or controversy. . . to countenance automatic
litigation-and automatic it would surely become-by states situated no
differently than was South Carolina in this instance."'
0 9
If states' broad assertions of injuries are combined with the Ninth
Circuit's holding that it is "[ir]relevant whether Proponents have suffered a
personal injury, in their capacities as private individuals," and that court's
further holding that states are apparently free to authorize anyone to
represent the state in litigation,' 10 one can easily see why some of the first
questions asked at oral argument seemed directly targeted at the breadth of
the Ninth Circuit's holding:
104. See infra notes 117-142 and accompanying text.
105. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007).
106. E.g., id. at 518 ("States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction.").
107. See Elliott, supra note 48, at 579-81 (2012).
108. Brief for Professors of Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 34,
Va. ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011) (citations omitted).
109. Alexander Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 79, 89-90.
110. Perry IV, 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis removed).
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Justice Kagan: "[C]ould the State assign to any citizen the rights to
defend a judgment of this kind?"' I
Chief Justice Roberts: "[A] State can't authorize anyone to proceed
in Federal court, because that would leave the definition under
Article III ... who has standing to bring claims up to each
State."' 2
Justice Kennedy: "But in this case the proponents ... must all act
in unison under California law.., so in that sense it's different
from simply saying any citizen."
1 13
At the same time, several Justices were extremely concerned about the
consequences for California's initiative system if the Proponents could not
defend the law:
Justice Kennedy: "The State could go in and make a defense,
maybe a half-hearted defense of the statute... and then when the
statute is held invalid ... simply leave.""
4
Justice Alito: "[I]f the Attorney General and the governor don't
like the ballot initiative, it will go undefended?"' 5
Justice Alito: "Now, in a State that has initiative, the whole process
would be defeated if the only people who could defend the statute
are the elected public officials.""
6
The solution to this dilemma would have been to reject the Ninth
Circuit's broad language and specifically rely on the initiative process itself
as a justification for proponent standing, adopting the California Supreme
Court's analysis. Unfortunately, a majority of the Court joined a troubling
and badly reasoned opinion that ignores the People of California's interest
in defending Prop 8.
C. The California Supreme Court's Analysis Was Proper Federalism
Standing
The Court could easily have rejected the Ninth Circuit's broad
language and adopted a much narrower view of standing based on
California's initiative process. That approach (taken by Justice Kennedy in
111. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 29.
115. Id. at 30.
116. Id. at 33.
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dissent) takes federalism seriously as a factor to be considered in standing
doctrine.
Justice Kennedy agrees with the majority that the key Article III
inquiry is the harm done to California: "[T]he State of California sustained
a concrete injury."' 1 7 If one believes that only California can sue to
vindicate such an injury," 8 the inquiry would end there. However, both the
majority and the dissent agree that such injuries are, in principle,
assignable.119
The question, then, is whether California can assign or otherwise
delegate to the Proponents the authority to defend its interests in court.
According to Justice Kennedy's dissent, it is not just any private citizen
who may represent California when state officials decline to do so. The
California Supreme Court determined that the Proponents were "a small,
identifiable group"; who "[b]ecause many of their decisions must be
unanimous" and "necessarily few in number"; whose "identities are
public"; and whose "commitment is substantial.' 120  To recognize the
Proponents as proper assignees or delegates of California's injury is far
from embracing the notion that a state could make anyone the proper party
to defend its interests in court.
Moreover, this interpretation of California's election laws issued from
the California Supreme Court. The Court should have been "bound by a
state court's construction of a state statute."' 21 In rejecting it, the United
States Supreme Court gave incredibly short shrift to a state supreme court's
interpretation of state law.
Indeed, the Court seems to impose a lot of its own ideas about good
governance on California: the class of proper representatives is apparently
117. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2664 (majority opinion) ("No one doubts that a State has a
cognizable interest 'in the continued enforceability' of its laws that is harmed by a judicial decision
declaring a state law unconstitutional.").
118. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
119. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 ("To vindicate [its interest in the constitutionality of its
laws] or any other, a State must be able to designate agents to represent it in federal court."); see also id.
at 2673-74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Nor do I find convincing the Court's invocation of the prudential
rule against third-party standing. Id. at 2663. The rule against third-party standing (where I am
prohibited from suing to vindicate your harm) is justified because, if you have been harm, you are in the
best position to decide whether to sue; if I sue on your behalf when you have decided not to sue, I am an
officious intermeddler. Here, it is true that state officials decided not to sue, and if the Proponents claim
to represent those interests, the third-party standing doctrine might apply. But the Proponents-
endorsed by the California Supreme Court--claimed to represent the People of California, and the
People, as the initiative and referendum system reflects, are not coextensive with California's elected
officials.
120. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,483 (1993)).
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limited to state officials or officially appointed agents. 1 2 But as Justice
Kennedy points out, "what the Court deems deficiencies in the proponents'
connection to the State government, the State Supreme Court saw as
essential qualifications to defend the initiative system." 123 Similarly,
"[t]here are reasons ... why California might conclude that a conventional
agency relationship is inconsistent with the history, design, and purpose of
the initiative process. 124 Thus the Court ignores "[t]he very object of the
initiative system[:] to establish a lawmaking process that does not depend
upon state officials.' 25
Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the majority's opinion is bad not only
for California but also for all states that use ballot initiatives and referenda
as means of making law. As I have argued elsewhere, "[t]o permit ballot
initiatives to change the law by direct democratic vote, but to have no
mechanism by which those initiatives can be defended in court, makes
hollow the promise of direct democracy."
126
Even the Court's rejection of the qui tam and assignment cases as
relevant precedents undermines state interests. Though the Court doesn't
say much on those cases, it appears to believe that those cases are justified
by historical practice under which proponent standing is too new to
qualify. 127 But ballot initiative systems were a reaction to changes wrought
by the Industrial Revolution and the incredible political corruption of the
Gilded Age, l2 8 and thus any justiciability questions arising from them
cannot have a historical pedigree dating back to the Founding.
The Court justifies its refusal to give weight to California's
interpretation by stating that "standing in federal court is a question of
122. Id. at 2664-65, 2666-67 (majority opinion). The Court makes much of its earlier decision in
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987), where former state legislators were held to lack standing to pursue
an appeal because New Jersey's statute authorized only the current holders of offices to appear in court.
The Court makes the leap to stating that those who represent a state must be current officeholders, no
matter what the state statute provides. That is not respectful of state choices.
123. Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2671.
125. Id. at 2670.
126. Elliott, supra note 48, at 571; see also Maxwell A. Steams, Grains of Sand or Butterfly
Effect: Standing, the Legitimacy of Precedent, and Reflections on Hollingsworth and Windsor, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 349, 396 (2013) ("[I]f a state has an initiative process, it must be permitted to establish an
external means of defending the outcome of that lawmaking process, which, after all, is designed
precisely to bypass elected public officials in policymaking, when those officials are unwilling to
defend the challenged law.").
127. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665.
128. William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 485, 494 (2006) ("Citizen initiative as a direct means of proposing legislation or
constitutional amendment was next publicly advocated in its modem form by reformers in South
Dakota and New Jersey in 1885, responding to social and economic upheavals brought about by the
Industrial Revolution and to widespread corruption of the legislative process of many if not most states
that prevented the adoption of remedial laws.").
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federal law, not state law. 1 29 But federalism is also a question of federal
law.1 30 To quote the Court's already notorious voting rights decision of
2013,
Outside the strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain
broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing
legislative objectives. Indeed, the Constitution provides that all
powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government are
reserved to the States or citizens. This allocation of powers in our
federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual
sovereignty of the States. But the federal balance is not just an end
in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.
131
Thus, the Court cannot sweep away California's interests in its own
election law as a state law issue because federalism-a part of federal
law-protects those interests. When standing doctrine and federalism
present incompatible answers, there is no ready way to choose, and the
Court cannot simply ignore California's interests by waving the Article III
banner.
To be sure, the Court may have been vindicating federalism concerns
more broadly by leaving the merits of marriage equality to the states for a
while longer. Thus federalism interests do not tug only in the direction of
protecting California's initiative system: the states more generally also may
have an interest in working through issues of social policy as our fifty
laboratories of democracy. 132 It is no accident that the Court's opinion
begins with the sentence: "The public is currently engaged in an active
political debate over whether same-sex couples should be allowed to
marry."' 33 Justice Kennedy also acknowledges that "the Court must be
cautious before entering a realm of controversy where the legal community
and society at large are still formulating ideas and approaches to a most
difficult subject.' 34 But, as Justice Kennedy goes on to say, "[I]t is
129. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
130. See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra note 3, at 1897-1901; id. at 1906 ("[F]ederalism [is] a key
motivation for restricting Article III power.").
131. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
132. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
133. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
134. Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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shortsighted to misconstrue principles of justiciability to avoid that
subject.'
35
There is also the institutional role of the Court itself. It is widely
thought that some members of the Court feared being caught in the political
debate over marriage equality and suffering the same kinds of critiques that
followed Roe v. Wade. 136 And as Professor Steams argues in this volume,
the social choice analysis of standing (which, he argues, permits the Court
to prevent private litigants from manipulating the path that doctrine takes)
may justify this course:
Perhaps some who joined the Hollingsworth majority thought that
the case for a constitutional right to same-sex marriage would be
strengthened if the precedents ... continued to develop
incrementally .... The irony, of course, is that this implicit
suggestion of judicial modesty... came at the price of two
seemingly problematic, and frankly non-modest, standing
decisions.
137
The Court also has the institutional role of protecting minorities from
the depredations of the majority: "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.' ' 8 When the state initiative system has been used, as here,
to oppress a historically excluded minority, the plaintiffs were obviously
correct to seek the assistance of the federal courts. One could further argue
that those plaintiffs, and others like them, need the Supreme Court-in its
institutional role as overseer of federal law and protector of discrete and
insular minorities-to confirm the district court's opinion under the federal
Constitution.
So we have a number of considerations that should go into the
determination of whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal: the federalism interests of California and other initiative and
referendum states, other states wishing to weigh in on marriage equality,
the institutional interests of the Supreme Court, and the liberty and equality
interests of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. To squeeze all these
interests into the tripartite test of standing seems nonsensical, as it often
135. Id.
136. But see Adam Liptak, Court Is 'One of Most Activist,' Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at AI, available at 2013 WLNR 21101236 (Justice Ginsburg stating her belief
that the Court had moved too fast in Roe but denying any connection between Roe and Hollingsworth).
137. Steams, supra note 126, at 397.
138. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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does. 139 A prudential doctrine of abstention, which I have advocated
elsewhere, would allow all these concerns to be addressed explicitly in the
Court's determination of its jurisdiction. 140 At a minimum, however,
Hollingsworth shows that the Court should incorporate some notion of
federalism into its standing analysis, just as it justifies that doctrine by
reference to separation of powers.
The Court's analysis in Hollingsworth, I think, also shows that it has
taken a major wrong turn in insisting that standing be present at all stages
of litigation. 14' By far the better answer comes from a recognition that
Fletcher made in his 1990 piece: Article III makes the Supreme Court the
ultimate arbiter of federal law questions. 142 Here, a federal trial court with
unquestioned jurisdiction struck down a state constitutional amendment
under the federal Constitution. That federal law question should be within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 143 That Court might abstain
for prudential reasons, but there is no need to spend pages and pages on a
standing inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Standing "is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers."' 144 But, as Judge Fletcher, Professor Hessick, and I have shown,
standing also has a role in maintaining the proper spheres of activity for the
federal and state governments. A proper view of federalism standing, such
as that taken by Justice Kennedy, would have found standing for the
Proponents. The Hollingsworth Court instead used standing to diminish the
states, and Hollingsworth will only add to the confusing morass that-
despite then-Professor Fletcher's efforts a quarter-century ago-is Article
III standing doctrine.
139. See generally Elliott, supra note 2 (showing that standing is made to perform many
functions to which it is totally unsuited).
140. Elliott, supra note 2, at 516 (arguing for a prudential abstention doctrine to replace much of
current standing doctrine so that courts can "more intelligibl[y] and thus more defensibl[y]" pursue
standing's goals).
141. Already, L.L.C. v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
142. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 283.
143. See Elliott, supra note 85.
144. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
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